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Maritime Security and Human Rights: The Role of the EU and its Member States in 
the Protection of Human Rights in the Maritime Domain 
 
Abstract 
Over the years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) have taken significant steps 
to enhance maritime security. However, these initiatives are mostly focused on the safety of ships 
and the protection of the marine environment rather than the protection of human rights at sea. 
Without belittling the importance of these initiatives, this article argues that it is time the protection 
of human rights at sea was also incorporated in the efforts to enhance maritime security. This 
argument is also supported by the analysis of the legal framework which shows that the EU and 
its MS as flag, coastal or port states have assumed responsibility to protect human rights at sea 
under the law of the sea, human rights law and EU law. 
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Introduction 
The protection of human rights in the maritime domain has gained considerable attention over the 
years.1 The drama of the hundreds of thousands of refugees trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea 
on board unseaworthy vessels,2 the revelations of fishers being turned into slaves on fishing boats,3 
the abuses suffered by seafarers abducted by pirates4 and the prolonged detention without judicial 
supervision of pirate suspects alerted the international community to the violations of human rights 
                                                          
1 For an extensive study on the protection of persons at sea, see I Papanicolopulu, International Law and the 
Protection of People at Sea (OUP, Oxford, 2018).  
2 I Mann, Humanity at Sea - Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law (CUP, Cambridge, 
2017). 
3 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and Fisheries 
Crime in the Indonesian Fishing Industry (2016) available at 
www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-Trafficking-Forced-Labour-and-Fisheries-Crime-in-
the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf; accessed 06 July 2019. 




that take place in the maritime domain.5 We are still far though from realising the nature and the 
scale of the abuses of persons at sea, and work needs to be done for their effective protection. This 
also holds true for the protection of human rights within the European waters, on board vessels 
that fly the flag of a Member State (MS) of the European Union (EU) or during law enforcement 
operations conducted by the EU naval forces or by its MS. The latter has received considerable 
attention in the context of anti-piracy and border control operations and will therefore not form 
part of the analysis of this article.6 Despite the great debate on the duties of the EU to protect 
human rights at sea these operations have sparked, this article argues that there is a lot more we 
need to consider in relation to the obligations of the EU and its MS to protect human rights in the 
maritime domain. 
 As explained above, human rights violations have become all too common at sea and 
different groups of people, such as fishers, seafarers, or criminal suspects, can be exposed to 
abuses. The EU is not unaware of the increasing maritime security threats and has acknowledged 
that they ‘pose a potential risk to European citizens and can be detrimental to the EU’s and its 
Member States’ strategic interests’.7 In its 2014 Maritime Security Strategy, the EU also took note 
of human rights as a founding value of the EU and as a guiding principle of the goals that the 
strategy intended to achieve.8 However, it is the view of this author that these general references 
to the protection of European citizens and the human rights values of the EU can only offer some 
recognition but cannot effectively safeguard human rights at sea. Of its 28 MS, 23 are coastal states 
and are thus responsible for the control of a coastline over 90,000 kilometres in length, which 
borders four seas and two oceans, and along which operate 1,200 commercial ports. In addition, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are responsible for the control of 
                                                          
5 E Kontorovich, ‘A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists’ (2010) 98 (1) 
California Law Review 243-275. 
6 Galani (n 4) at pp. 88-90; E Papastavridis, ‘EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta off Somalia: The EU in Unchartered 
Legal Waters?’ (2015) 64 (3) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 533-568; V Moreno-Law, ‘Seeking 
Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea’ 
(2011) 23 (2) International Journal of Refugee Law 174-220; N Markard, ‘The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits 
on EU Migration Control by Third Countries’ (2016) 27 (3) European Journal of International Law 591–616. 
7 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (11205/14) (24 June 2014) at p. 7. 
See also the The EU Maritime Security Strategy Revised Action Plan (26 June 2018) available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/eumss-revised-action-plan_en.pdf; accessed 06 July 
2019. 
8 Ibid., at pp. 3, 5. 
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twenty-five Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), all of which are islands.9 Of the 28 EU 
MS, 26 are flag states with 8,100 registered vessels (over 500 GT) and more than 80,000 fishing 
vessels operating worldwide. This means that hundreds of millions of people can find themselves 
within European waters or on-board EU flagged vessels.10 For example, it has been estimated that 
more than 400 million passengers pass though EU ports every year and by the end of 2016 above 
a quarter of a million of seafarers had been recorded to have served on board EU flagged vessels.11 
This shows that there is an urgent need to review the role of the EU and its MS in the protection 
of human rights not only of European citizens, but of every person who finds themselves within 
the European waters or on board an EU flagged vessel, and as a result within the jurisdiction of a 
MS. 
This article will therefore examine the duty of the EU and its MS to protect human rights 
at sea. It will start by discussing the definitions of maritime security and human security at sea and 
by explaining their importance for the EU and its MS. The third section will examine the relevant 
legal framework and will explain that the EU and its MS have a duty to protect human rights at 
sea under the law of the sea, human rights law and EU law. Against these legal frameworks, the 
efforts of the EU and its MS to safeguard human rights as flag, coastal and port States will be 
evaluated. It will be shown that due to the European experiences, the efforts of the EU to enhance 
maritime security have so far been focused on making the EU fleet more competitive, promoting 
the safety of ships and protecting the marine environment.12 This will support the overall argument 
of this article that in addition to the existing maritime security initiatives, it is time the EU and its 
MS stepped up their efforts to harmonise and enhance the protection of human rights on board EU 
flagged vessels and within the European waters.  
                                                          
9 EU Commission, ‘Towards an EU integrated approach to global maritime security’ (6 March 2014) available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/towards-eu-integrated-approach-global-maritime-security_en; accessed 8 June 2019. 
For the relationship between the EU and its OCTs, see Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) (OJ C 115/47) of 9 May 2008. 
10 EU Commission, ibid. 
11 European Union Maritime Security Strategy, ‘Responding together to Global Challenges, A Guide to 
Stakeholders’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/leaflet-european-union-
maritime-security-strategy_en.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019, at p. 2; European Maritime Safety Agency, Seafarers 
Statistics in the EU (18 July 2018) available at emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3321-
seafarer-statistics-in-the-eu-statistical-review-2016-data-stcw-is.html; accessed 8 June 2019, at p. 1.   
12 See, for example, the role the EU played in phasing out single-hull oil tankers from the European waters, 
following the sinking of Prestige in V Frank, ‘Consequences of the Prestige Sinking for European and International 





Maritime Security: An EU Perspective  
Maritime security has been described as one of the latest ‘buzzwords’, but there has been no 
international consensus on what it actually means.13 One would expect that the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) – the ‘Constitution of the Oceans’ - would 
provide some guidance on the meaning of maritime security.14 However, LOSC has scattered 
references to ‘security’ without providing any clear-cut definitions.15 A helpful guide to 
deconstruct the concept of maritime security could be the maritime security strategies published 
by various states and international organisations, including the EU.16 The common denominator 
in these strategies has been the listing of certain threats that undermine maritime security across 
the different regions. These include inter-state disputes, piracy, trafficking in drugs, people and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal fishing and environmental crimes or man-made 
disasters.17  
                                                          
13  C Bueger, ‘What is Maritime Security?’ (2015) 53 Marine Policy 159-164, at p. 159. 
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982), 1833 UNTS 396. 
15 S Galani and MD Evans, ‘The Interplay between Maritime Security and the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea: Help or Hindrance?’ in MD Evans & S Galani (eds), Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea: 
Help or Hindrance? (Edward Elgar, forthcoming); N Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP, 
Oxford, 2011) at pp. 2-11. 
16 The US National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005) available at 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/255380.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019; The UK National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (May 2014) available at 
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strateg
y_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019; the French National Strategy for the Security of 
Maritime Areas (22 October 2015) available at https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-
jointe/2016/01/strategie_nationale_de_surete_des_espaces_maritimes_en_national_strategy_for_the_security_of_m
aritime_areas.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019; African Union, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy (29 July 
2013) available at cggrps.org/wp-content/uploads/2050-AIM-Strategy_EN.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019; ASEAN 
Regional Forum Work Plan For Maritime Security 2018-2020 available at 
aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Plan%20of%20Action%20and%20Work%20Plans/ARF%20Maritime%2
0Security%20Work%20Plan%202018-2020.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019; NATO Alliance Maritime Security Strategy 
available (18 March 2011) available at https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm; accessed 8 
June 2019. See also the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé 
Charter) (2016) available at au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/33128-treaty-0060_-_lome_charter_e.pdf; accessed 8 
June 2019 and the CARICOM Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement, 4 July 2008 (not yet in 
force), which are the first legally binding regional agreements on maritime security.  
17 The same threats are also identified in the UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the law of the sea (10 
March 2008) (A/63/63) at pp. 18-33. 
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Despite the general agreement on the negative impact of these threats on maritime security, 
the various strategies also show that maritime security is defined by the specific needs and 
priorities of each country or region. The recurring sovereignty disputes in Southeast Asia, for 
example, have prompted the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to emphasise the 
threats posed to maritime security by military threats and inter-state disputes.18 For the African 
Union (AU), the weakness of African States to pass uniform legislation and the lack of funds to 
maintain aids to navigation have been identified among the key challenges posed to maritime 
security in the region.19 However, none of these seems to be a challenge for the EU. The creation 
of the EU represented an effort to integrate Europe aspiring closer economic, social, political and 
military ties in the aftermath of World War II which has meant that border and sovereignty disputes 
do not represent a major challenge for the EU. In addition, the unique legal nature of the EU has 
given it the competence to legislate and to budget for key areas across the MS, including maritime 
affairs, as will be discussed below.20  
It is notable though that the EU Maritime Security Strategy is not only focused on the 
interests of its MS, but it also makes direct references to the importance of safeguarding the 
interests of the European citizens while tackling maritime insecurity.21 This shows the importance 
the EU attaches to human security. Despite its fluid meaning, human security is considered one of 
the four core dimensions of maritime security along with national security, the protection of the 
marine environment and economic development.22 The concept of human security was first 
introduced in the 1994 Human Development report which envisaged a new understanding of 
security focused on individuals as opposed to national security.23 Gradually, human security has 
been given maritime dimensions – a collective and an individual one.24 The collective aspect of 
                                                          
18 ASEAN Work Plan (n 16) (2018-2020) at p. 7. 
19 AIM Strategy (n 16) at para. 69; Lomé Charter (n 16) at para. 16. 
20 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration [1963] EUECJ R-26/62 (5 February 1963) at p. 12. See also the discussion below pp. 6-8. 
21 EU Maritime Security Strategy (n 17) at pp. 2-3, 6-7.  
22 Bueger (n 13) at p. 161.  
23 UNDP, Human Development Report (1994) available at 
http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf; accessed 8 June 2019 at 
pp. 22-40. See also M Martin and T Owen, ‘The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and 
EU Experience’ (2010) 86 (1) International Affairs 211-224.  
24 K Kittichaisaree, ‘A Code of Conduct for Human and Regional Security Around the South China Sea’ (2010) 32 
(2) Ocean Development & International Law 131-147, at p. 133. 
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human security at sea refers to the economic and environmental interests of coastal communities 
and the risks posed to these communities by illegal fishing, environmental crimes or even piracy.25 
Individual human security, on the other hand, is understood to refer to the safety and protection of 
seafarers from abuses on board vessels.26 This article submits that individual human security at sea 
should be more broadly understood to encompass the protection of human rights of all persons at 
sea. Due to the nature of the employment of seafarers and the lengthy periods of time they spend 
on board vessels or maritime installations, they are probably more exposed to risks of human rights 
abuses at sea, but there are other groups of people who also face risks of human rights violations 
at sea. Fishers, migrants, criminal suspects and passengers can also be affected by human rights 
violations and, hence, their protection should also form part of the efforts to safeguard human 
security at sea.27  
 The discussion shows that while the references to the protection of EU citizens in the 
strategy is a step towards promoting human security at sea, the focus only on European citizens is 
narrow to say the least. The statistics discussed above show that many people – not only European 
citizens – can find themselves in a daily risk of having their human rights violated within the 
European waters.28 At the same time, a large number of people face the risk of being abused on 
board vessels flying the flag of a MS around the world. It is therefore argued that the EU cannot 
only care for European citizens, but it has to take steps to protect the human rights of all persons 
within its jurisdiction as explained in the following sections.  
The Legal Framework 
Before we evaluate the role of the EU and its MS in the protection of human rights in the maritime 
domain, this section will examine where the duties of the EU and its MS derive from. It will be 
explained that both the EU and its MS have assumed responsibility to protect human rights under 
international and EU law.  
The 1982 LOSC 
                                                          
25 A Thorpe et al, ‘Fisheries and Failing States: The Case of Sierra Leone’ (2009) 33 (2) Marine Policy 393–400; J 
Abbott, N Renwick, ‘Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Societal Security in Southeast Asia’ (1999) 11 (1) Pacifica 
Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 4–24. 
26 Kittichaisaree (n 24) at p. 133. 
27 Papanicolopulu (n 1) at pp. 17-24. 
28 See the introduction of this article.  
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The analysis of the legal framework shall start by discussing the obligations of the EU and its MS 
under LOSC. All 28 MS have ratified LOSC.29 In 1998, the EU became the first international 
organisation (IO) to ratify the Convention.30 Today, the EU remains the only IO to have ratified 
LOSC and is thus placed in a special position. While the EU did not participate in the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982), and the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) only had an observer status during the conference, the European Commission 
considered the ratification of LOSC necessary.31 The participation of the EU in LOSC was 
facilitated by Article 305(1)(f) LOSC which provides that the Convention is open for signature to 
international organisations (IO), in accordance with Annex IX. Article 1 of Annex IX defines an 
IO as ‘an intergovernmental organisation constituted by States to which its Member States have 
transferred competence over matters governed by the Convention, including competence to enter 
into treaties in respect of those matters.’ This provision is particularly relevant to the EU for two 
reasons. First, the EU has the competence to ratify international agreements that bind both the EU 
and its MS, the so-called ‘mixed agreements’.32 Second, the EU has exclusive and shared 
competences to regulate on issues largely governed by LOSC. More specifically, the EU has 
exclusive competence to legislate alone on issues concerning conservation of marine biological 
resources under the common fisheries policy.33 It also has shared competence to legislate on other 
matters covered by LOSC, such as maritime transport, safety of shipping and prevention of marine 
pollution, and if it decides to exercise its competence, the MS have to comply with EU 
legislation.34 
Given that both the EU and its MS are bound by LOSC, it is worth examining what duties 
might arise from the Convention in terms of protecting human rights at sea. LOSC does not have 
any direct references to human rights or their protection, which is unsurprising given the time the 
                                                          
29 UN Division for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and 
successions to the Convention and the related Agreements available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm; accessed 8 June 2019.   
30 Ibid.  
31 E Paasivirta, ‘The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2015) 38 (4) 
Fordham International Law Journal 1045-1071, at pp. 1047-1048. 
32 Article 47 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (OJ C 326) of 26 October 2012. See also, C Hillion and P 
Koutrakos (eds) Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member States in the World (Hart, Oxford, 2010). 
33 Article 3 TEU. 
34 Article 4 TEU; Article 91 TFEU. 
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Convention was drafted and the purposes it sought to achieve.35 Nonetheless, this is not to say that 
LOSC is silent on the protection of persons at sea. There are several LOSC provisions that seek to 
protect individuals at sea and to limit the enforcement powers of States, such as the articles that 
provide for assistance to persons or ships in distress, the obligation of rescue,36 the duty to release 
vessels and crews promptly,37 and the restrictions on imprisonment penalties for fishing and 
pollution violations.38 In line with its LOSC obligations, the EU has adopted a wide range of 
Regulations and Directives in order to protect human lives and the safety of persons at sea.39 
However, this article argues that these responses have certain limitations. First, general references 
to safety are no longer adequate to address the increasing human rights violations in the maritime 
domain. For example, the suffering of seafarers taken hostage by pirates or of fishers being forced 
to slavery cannot be tackled by references to safety. Moreover, as it often happens in the field of 
the law of the sea, measures are adopted to respond rather than to prevent an accident.40 In the case 
of the EU, for example, the Directives on the safety of ro-ro ferries were adopted in response to 
the sinking of MS Estonia on 28 September 1994 en route from Tallinn to Stockholm, one of the 
deadliest maritime accidents in European waters.41 While these measures are necessary for 
improving safety at sea, a more proactive approach that will prevent human rights violations at sea 
is needed. It is therefore argued that LOSC cannot offer on its own the legal framework needed to 
holistically and effectively protect human rights in the maritime domain.  
Human Rights Law  
In light of the above conclusion, it is argued that the effective protection of human rights in the 
maritime domain requires an assessment of the duties the EU and its MS have under human rights 
                                                          
35 T Treves, ‘Human Rights and the Law of the Sea’ (2010) 28 (1) Berkeley Journal of International Law 1-14; S 
Cacciaguidi-Fahy, ‘The Law of the Sea and Human Rights’ (2007) 19 (1) Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 
85-108. 
36 Articles 18, 98, 146 LOSC. 
37 Article 73 LOSC. 
38 Article 240 LOSC. 
39 European Commission, Maritime Transport: A Selection of Essential EU Legislation Dealing with Safety and 
Pollution Prevention (2016). 
40 F Attard, ‘IMO’s Contribution to International Law Regulating Maritime Security’ (2014) 45 (4) Journal of 
Maritime Law & Commerce 479-566. 
41 BBC, ‘Bow Door Blamed for Estonia Ferry Disaster’ (3 December 1997) available at 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/36529.stm; accessed 8 June 2019; Council Directive 1999/35/EC of 29 April 1999 on a 
system of mandatory surveys for the safe operation of regular ro-ro ferry and high-speed passenger craft services; 
Directive 2003/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 April 2003 on specific stability 
requirements for ro-ro passenger ships. 
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law. It is now well-established that realising human rights at sea requires reading and applying the 
law of the sea and human rights law together.42 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) has also adopted this approach arguing that the law of the sea cannot operate in a 
vacuum.43 Indeed, it has been stated that due consideration has to be given to human rights during 
maritime law enforcement operations.44 The same approach has been adopted by human rights 
bodies and courts which have built a body of case law reinforcing the idea that human rights law 
applies at sea. In line with international human rights law and the jurisprudence on the human 
rights obligations of States at sea, it has been established that States have to protect the human 
rights of persons within their jurisdiction. In the maritime domain, States have jurisdiction in their 
territorial waters, on board vessels that fly their flags and when they exercise effective control over 
persons at sea.45  
With reference to the MS, it is now uncontested that they remain bound by their 
international human rights obligations when they exercise jurisdiction in the maritime domain. In 
addition, MS have duties under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).46 The 
European Court of Human Rights, which has probably the most advanced jurisprudence on the 
protection of human rights in the maritime domain, has left no room for doubt that the Contracting 
Parties remain bound by their ECHR duties when they exercise jurisdiction at sea.47 The exercise 
of effective control over persons at sea applies independently from the maritime zones or the flag 
of a vessel. In Medvedyev and others v France, for example, in which French authorities 
interdicted, Winner, a Cambodian flagged vessel suspected of drug trafficking and confined the 
crew aboard for a thirteen-day trip to a French port, it was established that 
                                                          
42 For the discussion of an inter-regime approach, see Papanicolopulu (n 1) pp. 80-95. 
43 The M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) Judgment, ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 10 
at para. 155.  
44 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v Russia) PCA Case No 2014-02 Award on the Merits (14 August 2015) 
at para. 197. 
45 J.H.A. v Spain, CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (21 November 2008), UNCAT Communication No. 323/2007; Fatou 
Sonko v Spain CAT/C/47/D/368/2008 (20 February 2012); UNCAT Communication No. 368/2008; The Haitian 
Centre for Human Rights et al. v United States, Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Inter-
Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 550 (1997); Women on Waves v Portugal (Application No. 31276/05) 
(ECtHR, 3 February 2009); Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (Application No. 27765/09) (ECtHR, 23 February 2012); Sharifi 
and Others v Italy and Greece (Application No.16643/09) (ECtHR, 21 October 2014); Hassan and Others v France 
(Application Nos 46695/10 and 54588/10) (ECtHR, 4 December 2014). 
46 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) ETS 5. 
47 See n 45. 
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France having exercised full and exclusive control over the Winner and its crew, at least de facto, 
from the time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted manner until they were tried in 
France, the applicants were effectively within France’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of 
the Convention.48  
It might be more difficult to argue that the EU bears the same human rights obligations. The EU 
has not ratified any of the core UN human rights treaties.49 Despite the long-term negotiations for 
the accession of the EU to the ECHR, the EU has not ratified the ECHR yet.50 However, the EU 
is still bound by customary international law to protect human rights with peremptory character, 
such as torture and slavery. The European Court of the EU (CJEU) has repeatedly confirmed, the 
EU has to respect international law - both treaty and customary -in the exercise of its powers. 51 
Accordingly, the EU has a duty to prevent torture and slavery within the European waters or on-
board vessels that fly the flag of a MS. 
  There is, of course, one more instrument that we could consider when examining the 
human rights obligations of the EU and its MS, and that is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (the EU Charter).52 The relevance of the Charter to the protection of human rights at sea 
has not been carefully considered yet.53 This article argues, however, that the EU Charter could 
become a critical tool for keeping both the EU institutions and the MS in line with their human 
rights obligations. Article 51 of the EU Charter states that ‘the provisions of this Charter are 
addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’. The provision 
leaves no doubt that the EU institutions must comply with the EU Charter and as a result, EU 
                                                          
48 Medvedyev and Others v France (Application No. 3394/03) (ECtHR, 29 March 2010) para. 67. This issue is of 
particular importance to the obligations the EU and its MS when they conduct law enforcement operations at sea. 
See the discussion in the introduction of this article and n 6. 
49 UN Office of the High Commissioner, The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring 
Bodies available at www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/coreinstruments.aspx; accessed 8 June 2018.  
50 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (18 December 2014).  
51 Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, paras. 9-10; Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR 
I-3655, paras. 45-46; Case C-366/10, The Air Association of America, Judgment of December 2011, para. 101. See 
also, F Mégret and F Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations 
Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 (2) Human Rights Quarterly 314-342, at pp. 315-318. 
52 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (26 October 2012) 2012/C 326/02. 
53 The alleged violations of the Charter mainly reach the CJEU through a preliminary reference (Article 267 TEU) 
and despite the Treaty of Lisbon improvements, it is still difficult for individuals to have their case heard by the 
CJEU. See, G de Burca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator’ (2013) 20 (2) Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 168-184, at p. 170.  
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legislation on maritime affairs must also be compatible with the EU Charter obligations. The 
interpretation of Article 51 has been slightly more controversial when it comes to the duties of the 
MS under the EU Charter because it has not always been clear when MS implement Union law for 
the purposes of the provision.54 The bottom line, however, seems to be that ‘the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter must be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope 
of European Union law.’55 By applying the criteria introduced in Siragusa in order to understand 
when national legislation falls within the scope of Union law – ‘whether that legislation is intended 
to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives 
other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also 
whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it’ – it could be 
concluded that national legislation adopted to implement EU legislation and policies that fall 
within the EU’s exclusive or shared competences on maritime affairs should also comply with the 
EU Charter.56  
 One challenge that could arise with requiring the EU and its MS to comply with the EU 
Charter when it comes to the regulation of activities on board vessels, in the EU ports and within 
the European waters is the territorial scope and potential extraterritorial effects of this regulation.57 
The EU Charter does not have a jurisdictional clause similar to those that we can find in other 
human rights treaties.58 To understand the territorial scope of the EU Treaties, we need to look at 
Article 52 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 355 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 52 TEU states that the EU treaties apply to 
the territory of MS and Article 355 TFEU defines the areas that are included or excluded from the 
EU territory. However, these provisions do not provide a clear definition of the territorial scope of 
the EU Charter either. It is therefore suggested that we should stick to the main rule under the law 
of the sea and international human rights law that States remain bound by their human rights 
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obligations when they exercise jurisdiction in the maritime domain. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that the EU and its MS exercise jurisdiction within the European waters – ports and territorial seas 
– and on EU-flagged vessels and have to comply with the EU Charter.  
 
The Duties of the EU and MS to Protect Human Rights in the Maritime Domain 
Having examined the legal framework from which the duties of the EU and its MS to protect 
human rights in the maritime domain derive, this section will discuss the steps they have taken to 
comply with these duties and evaluate whether these steps are adequate to address human rights 
violations at sea.  To do so, the zonal approach of LOSC will be relied upon and the rights and 
duties of the EU and its MS to protect human rights as coastal, port and flag States will be 
examined.  
The EU and its MS as Flag States 
Despite the concerns that the EU fleet is declining, 30 per cent of world vessels and more than 42 
per cent of seaborne trade are managed by EU shipowners.59 It has also been reported that there 
are more than 8,100 EU flagged vessels (over 500 GT) and more than 80,000 EU fishing vessels 
operating worldwide.60 This means that the role of the EU and its MS in the protection of the 
human rights on board these vessels requires special attention.  
One of the key principles of the law of the sea that is ‘fiercely protected’ by LOSC is the 
exclusive jurisdiction flag States have on board vessels registered to their flags when sailing on 
the high seas.61 LOSC gives every State – coastal or landlocked – the right to grant its nationality 
upon a vessel.62 It also requires every flag State to ‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control 
in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’.63 Reading this provision 
together with the human rights principle that wants flag States to have jurisdiction on board vessels 
for the purposes of enforcing human rights, it is argued that the EU and its MS have a duty to 
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protect human rights on board their vessels. This principle, however, which could ideally guarantee 
the protection of human rights on vessels, is rather problematic in practice. The core difficulty lies 
in the fact that some flag States, those that operate open registries in particular, are unwilling or 
unable to comply with their international responsibilities, including their human rights 
obligations.64  
This difficulty is also relevant to the case of the EU and its MS undermining the effective 
protection of human rights on board vessels. One of the challenges is the lack of an EU flag. 
Despite the efforts of the Commission to establish a Community ship registry - the ‘EUROS’ – 
which would require vessels of 500 GT to fly the EU flag next to the national flag with a view to 
making the EU fleet more competitive, the proposal was never adopted.65 The MS and the shipping 
industry appeared reluctant to subscribe to unified flag rules set by the EU.66 This has meant that 
the MS continue to operate their own ship registries which are subjected to different registration 
requirements and control standards.67 For example, Malta and Cyprus, whose accession to the EU 
in 2004 increased significantly the Union’s share of the world’s shipping, operate open registries 
and have flexible registration procedures.68 Open registries are known for their Flags of 
Convenience (FOCs) that appeal to shipowners who wish to avoid taxes and strict controls on their 
vessels. In response to the increasing number of shipowners opting for the financial benefits of 
FOCs, Denmark and Norway introduced the so-called second or international registry.69 This type 
of registry combines the characteristics of open and closed registries and has now been adopted by 
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several other MS, including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and the United 
Kingdom.70  
In addition to the different ship registries operating within the EU, there is nothing to 
prevent EU shipowners from registering their vessels under flags outside of the EU. Indeed, Greece 
is an illustrative example of a thriving shipping power with vessels of Greek interests flying flags 
of almost 45 different States, most of them FOCs.71 This means that these vessels, although of EU 
interests, are subscribed to a regime which might not share the same human rights values as the 
EU and has no safeguards in place for the protection of human rights on board vessels.  At the 
same time, shipping companies might seek to register their vessels under the flag of a MS mainly 
for the financial and trade benefits the ships registered to the EU enjoy without, however, having 
any link with the EU or any interest in the human rights values of the EU.72 
The consequence of the lack of an EU flag and the parallel operation of different types of 
ship registries within the EU is that the protection of human rights on board vessels depends on 
the ability and willingness of each MS to monitor and enforce human rights standards on board 
vessels that fly their flags. Some flag States with stricter registration and control requirements 
might be more active in exercising jurisdiction and monitoring human rights standards on board 
vessels, while others might appear less willing to subject their vessels to strict human rights 
controls. At the same time, EU shipowners can escape their human rights obligations by registering 
their vessels outside of the EU, while other shipping companies with questionable human and 
labour standards can benefit from the flag of a MS without subscribing to the values of the EU.  
The competitiveness in the shipping industry has rendered the efforts of the Commission 
for a unified flag unsuccessful and it is hard to believe that such an initiative would succeed any 
time soon. This, however, does not mean that the EU is powerless to harmonise the protection of 
human rights on board EU flagged vessels. The economic incentives and trade benefits that EU 
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flagged vessels enjoy should be accompanied by stricter requirements regarding the protection of 
human rights and the failure to comply with human rights obligations should result in losing out 
on these privileges. One such requirement could be the effective implementation of Regulation 
5.1.5 of the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) which introduced on-board complaint 
procedures intended to enable seafarers to lodge complaints relating to any matter that is alleged 
to constitute a breach of the requirements of the 2006 MLC.73 Under this regulation, flag states 
have a duty to implement a mechanism for the fair, effective and expeditious handling of seafarer 
complaints on flag states. In case a seafarer cannot have his/her complaint reviewed under this 
mechanism, (s)he should be able to access national courts. This would require all MS to ensure 
that their national legislation applies on board vessels flying their flags empowering national courts 
to review relevant complaints. The enhanced port State control (PSC) exercised by the EU, 
discussed below, could also be used to fill in the gaps left by the failure of flag States to protect 
human rights on board the vessels that fly their flags.  
The EU and its MS as Coastal States  
Having looked at the duties of MS to protect human rights as flag States and the challenges that 
arise from the lack of a unified EU flag, it is time to examine their duties as coastal States. The 
rights and obligations of coastal States within their territorial sea, their Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and continental shelf are largely regulated by LOSC. As noted above, however, in order to 
understand the human rights obligations of the EU and its MS as coastal States it is necessary to 
consider the human rights framework, and the discussion below will also be informed by human 
rights law.  
Territorial Sea 
The obligation of the EU and its MS to protect human rights within their territorial waters could 
be largely uncontroversial, had it not been limited by navigational rights, which also hold an 
important place in LOSC.74 Under Article 2 LOSC, it is established that coastal States have 
sovereignty over the 12nm that form their territorial sea. This means that coastal States enjoy 
extensive sovereign rights over their territorial waters which are comparable to the sovereign rights 
they enjoy on land. It is also unquestionable that people within the territorial waters of the EU are 
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within its jurisdiction for the purposes of human rights, and the EU and its MS have to respect and 
protect their rights. The right of coastal States, however, to enforce human rights within their 
territorial sea is curbed by the right of innocent passage. The right of innocent passage represents 
one of the core values of the freedom of navigation and is explained in Article 19 LOSC as a 
passage ‘not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State’. Its protection is 
reinforced by Article 27 LOSC. This provision does not permit coastal states to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction ‘on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to 
conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its 
passage’ save in clear-cut exceptions which include crimes with consequences extending to the 
coastal state or which can disturb the peace or good order of the territorial sea, or in case the master 
of the ship or a flag state representative has requested assistance, or if such measures are necessary 
for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking. The exceptions listed by Article 27 LOSC do not 
refer to human rights violations committed on board a vessel, and it would be far-fetched to argue 
that human rights violations have consequences for or affect the good order of a coastal state. As 
a result, a coastal state would be able to intervene only if the master or a flag state official requested 
help. This provides some potential for the conduct of an investigation and subsequent criminal 
enforcement action against human rights violations taken by coastal states, but the effectiveness 
of the provision relies on the will of the master of the ship or flag state officials to report the 
problem and request assistance. Unfortunately, the wording of the provision seems to suggest that 
if the crew or the passengers of a vessel notify the coastal State of human rights abuses, the MS 
might not have the legal basis to intervene.  
To mitigate this problem, one could explore the possibility of characterising the violations 
of human rights law as not innocent passage. Given that LOSC is a ‘living treaty’ and Article 19 
(2) LOSC does not provide an exhaustive list of activities not constituting innocent passage, severe 
human rights violations could be considered prejudicial to coastal States.75 Admittedly, this 
approach could open Pandora’s box and allow severe interference with the freedom of navigation 
but could act as a counterpart to the failure of flag States to enforce human rights on board their 
vessels. A less controversial alternative could be that coastal States could exercise jurisdiction over 
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crimes of torture and slavery committed on board vessels passing through their territorial sea 
because of the jus cogens nature of these rights.76 In this case, MS notified of abuses on board 
vessels that amount to torture or of slavery practices could inspect the vessel and investigate any 
violations.  
EEZ 
Coastal States have fewer powers within the 200nm of their EEZ as their sovereign rights are 
limited to ‘exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources’ within this 
zone.77 The jurisdiction they can exercise is limited to performing exploration and exploitation 
activities and is restrained by the freedom of navigation and the jurisdiction of the flag State.78 
From a human rights perspective, this means that what the EU and MS can do in order to protect 
human rights within the EEZ is rather limited. However, it has been explained that illegal fishing, 
which mostly takes places within the 200nm of coastal States, is linked to severe human rights 
abuses with fishers being subjected to torture and slavery. It is therefore important to examine 
whether there is room for protecting fishers operating within the EEZs of a MS against human 
rights abuses on the basis of the existing framework.  
The EU has exclusive competence on fisheries and over the years it has developed the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) for managing fishing fleets and conserving fish stocks.79 In 
addition, the CFP is aimed at ensuring equal access to all European fishing fleets to EU waters and 
fair competition. The CFP has a strong emphasis on the conservation of fisheries that is 
unsurprising considering that the LOSC provisions also seek to optimize fishing in a sustainable 
manner.80 However, there are no specific provisions intended to protect human rights on board 
vessels. This comes to stark contrast to the clause concerning respect for human rights included in 
all protocols to the EU Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements, which the Commission has 
concluded with non-member countries, and allow EU flagged fishing vessels to fish for surplus 
stocks in the EEZ of these countries. Distant fishing in the EEZs of lower income countries, mainly 
African countries, could allow for the exploitation of human rights and thus, the EU has sought to 
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create a legally regulated environment that can protect human rights as well as sustainable 
fishing.81 In the same sense, it is suggested that the EU could equally act to put safeguards in place 
for the protection of human rights of fishers on board boats operating within the EEZs of its own 
MS. Turning a blind eye to the abuse of fishers within the EEZs of MS so long as they comply 
with the conservation rules of the CFP can no longer be an acceptable approach. The EU should 
therefore use the powers it has under Article 73 LOSC to inspect human rights on board vessels 
that fish within the EEZ of MS and ban access to boats that do not comply with human rights 
standards.82  
Platforms and Maritime Installations 
One category of people that is often overlooked when we talk about human rights at sea are those 
who work on platforms or other maritime installations. As it happens with seafarers and fishers, 
people employed to work on platforms and installations are usually far from land and might have 
their human rights violated without any monitoring or inspections. Articles 60 and 80 LOSC 
provide that coastal States have exclusive jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and 
structures in the EEZ and the continental shelf. This means that the EU and MS should be 
responsible for protecting the human rights of those working on maritime installations within the 
EEZ and continental shelf of a MS. Indeed, in Salemink the Court of Justice of the EU found that 
the EU legislation on social security applies to persons employed on a platform built within the 
continental shelf of the Netherlands.83 The case is reassuring in that these people are also covered 
by EU law, including the EU Charter.  
The EU and MS as Port States  
In the introduction of this article, it was noted that there are 1,800 ports and harbours within the 
EU which means that the EU and MS have strategic interests as port States. Ports are essentially 
within the EU internal waters. It is therefore uncontested that port States can enforce domestic 
legislation upon vessels that voluntarily enter the territory of a MS.84 Under the law of the sea, port 
                                                          
81 European Commission, EU Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (2017) available at 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c8b5d962-0d38-11e7-8a35-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-37907030; accessed 8 June 2019. 
82 Papanicolopulu (n 1) at pp. 141-142. 
83 Case C‑347/10 A. Salemink v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen, Judgment 
of 17 January 2012 at paras. 30-31.  




States have jurisdiction mostly on issues relating to the safety and security of vessels and the 
protection of the marine environment.85 The exercise of Port State Control (PSC), however, has 
come under strict scrutiny because of its extraterritorial effects.86 While port States can regulate 
issues relating to the vessels that enter their ports, they might end up exercising jurisdiction over 
activities or crimes that took place before a vessel entered their port, such as discharge of toxic 
waste on the high seas or illegal fishing in the EEZ of another coastal State.87 Despite some 
criticisms, there has been an emerging school of thought which supports the idea that ‘responsible 
port States’ should exercise jurisdiction over crimes against global commons, such as fisheries and 
the marine environment, especially in cases flag States fail to act.88  
In the context of human rights, the exercise of jurisdiction on board vessels entering the 
port of a State should be less controversial. Human rights abuses on board these vessels are in 
breach of the port State’s human rights obligations and as a result, the port State should be able to 
intervene.89 While a port State might not be able to exercise jurisdiction for violations of human 
rights committed when the vessel was on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of another coastal 
or port State, it should be able to exercise its jurisdiction over continuing abuses or abuses that 
started when the vessel entered its port. Accordingly, vessels voluntarily entering EU ports should 
comply with the EU human rights standards, and the EU and its MS should be able to inspect and 
enforce human rights on board these vessels.  
The EU has been active in protecting port security and gradually the protection of human 
rights could also be incorporated in port security measures. The EU has sought to enhance port 
security through its participation in the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). The 
drafting and adoption of the Paris MoU was triggered by the sinking of the crude oil tanker Amoco 
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Cadiz in 1978 which resulted in a massive oil spill off the French coasts.90 In addition to the 25 
EU port States, the European Commission is also a member of the Port State Control Committee 
(PSCC), the executive body of the Paris MoU. The role of the PSCC is to inspect vessels entering 
the ports of the participating States to ensure compliance with safety, security, environmental and 
labour standards. The Paris MoU is aimed at eliminating the entry and operation of sub-standard 
vessels within the ports of participating States through publicising the findings of the inspections, 
naming and shaming those ship owners who fail to meet the international standards of safety and 
security and occasionally by detaining their vessels.91 The EU has further supplemented port 
security efforts by adopting Directives to enhance the safety and efficiency of maritime traffic 
through a vessel traffic monitoring and information system and by reducing sub-standard vessels 
within the European waters.92 
In the case of the EU, this harmonised system is of particular importance as it can also 
eliminate port shopping practices and effectively enforce maritime security standards across the 
EU ports.93 The focus of the Paris MoU is not on human rights, but the power it gives to the EU 
and MS to inspect labour conditions could be a first step towards enhancing the living and working 
standards of seafarers on board vessels. While labour rights are not strictly speaking human rights, 
some labour rights are also recognised and protected by human rights treaties, and this could 
contribute to an emerging recognition and protection of human rights standards on board vessels.94 
The 2006 MLC is one of the core labour conventions that must be complied with on board vessels, 
and is used to measure the labour standards as part of the Paris MoU inspections. In addition, port 
States might be able to assist seafarers lodging complaints on board vessels while in port under 
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Regulation 5.1.5 and intervene in cases they are victimised as a result of their complaints.95 
Victimisation is defined to cover ‘any adverse action taken by any person with respect to a seafarer 
for lodging a complaint which is not manifestly vexatious or maliciously made’ and could include 
acts in violation of seafarers’ human rights.96 Whereas the EU has not ratified the 2006 MLC and 
is not a party to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) either, it has transposed large parts 
of the Convention into EU law which has been further supplemented by social security measures 
aimed at protecting those working within the EU maritime transport sector.97 The EU and its MS 
should therefore inspect and enforce labour standards on board vessels entering their ports. 
The Paris MoU and the exercise of PSC have been effective tools for enforcing safety and 
pollution prevention standards and enhancing maritime security within the EU. 98 Inspecting and 
enforcing the 2006 MLC standards on board vessels have also been significant in terms of 
enhancing the living and working conditions of seafarers. The EU has further invested in the 
effective implementation of the Paris MoU by establishing the European Maritime Security 
Agency (EMSA), which provides technical support and exchanges information with the maritime 
authorities of the MS.99 However, for the time being these efforts lack a focus on the protection of 
human rights that can no longer be justified in light of the increasing human rights violations and 
the failure of some flag States to act to protect them. This article therefore submits that the 
inspection of human rights standards should also form part of the Paris MoU procedures and the 
findings should also be publicised and become part of the performance standards of ships.  
Conclusion 
This article highlighted the strain under which the human rights of persons at sea have come 
because of the increasing threats posed to maritime security. It was explained that the EU is aware 
of these threats and has adopted various initiatives to tackle them. Most of these initiatives, 
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however, were adopted to make the EU fleet more competitive, to protect safety at sea or to enforce 
marine environmental standards. This has meant that human security at sea has so far been 
overlooked by the EU and its MS. It was therefore argued that it is time to incorporate the 
protection of human rights in the efforts of the EU to enhance maritime security. The examination 
of the relevant legal framework also lent support to this argument as it was demonstrated that the 
EU and its MS have assumed responsibility to protect human rights under the law of the sea, human 
rights law and EU law. The EU and its MS have both strategic interests in maritime security and 
an important role to play in the protection of human rights in the maritime domain as flag, coastal 
and port States. Despite the legal and practical challenges, human security at sea has to emerge as 
one of the core elements of the maritime security efforts so that the human rights are effectively 
protected within the EU maritime domain and on-board EU flagged vessels. 
 
 
 
 
